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Abstract
Deep neural network (DNN) predictions have been
shown to be vulnerable to carefully crafted adversarial
perturbations. Specifically, image-agnostic (universal
adversarial) perturbations added to any image can fool a
target network into making erroneous predictions. Depart-
ing from existing defense strategies that work mostly in the
image domain, we present a novel defense which operates
in the DNN feature domain and effectively defends against
such universal perturbations. Our approach identifies pre-
trained convolutional features that are most vulnerable to
adversarial noise and deploys trainable feature regenera-
tion units which transform these DNN filter activations into
resilient features that are robust to universal perturbations.
Regenerating only the top 50% adversarially susceptible
activations in at most 6 DNN layers and leaving all remain-
ing DNN activations unchanged, we outperform existing
defense strategies across different network architectures by
more than 10% in restored accuracy. We show that without
any additional modification, our defense trained on Ima-
geNet with one type of universal attack examples effectively
defends against other types of unseen universal attacks.
Code/models available at https://github.com/
tsborkar/Selective-feature-regeneration
1. Introduction
Despite the continued success and widespread use of
DNNs in computer vision tasks [25, 59, 62, 18, 55, 54,
58, 68], these networks make erroneous predictions when
a small magnitude, carefully crafted perturbation (adversar-
ial noise) almost visually imperceptible to humans is added
to an input image [63, 15, 35, 6, 24, 41, 48, 26, 49]. Further-
more, such perturbations have been successfully placed in a
real-world scene via physical adversarial objects [3, 12, 26],
thus posing a security risk.
Most existing adversarial attacks use target network gra-
dients to construct an image-dependent adversarial exam-
ple [63, 15, 26, 41, 49, 6] that has limited transferability
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Figure 1. Effectiveness of proposed defense against various univer-
sal perturbations: row 1 shows an image (class label: ”ice cream”)
perturbed by different universal attacks (UAP [38], NAG [44],
GAP [51] and sPGD [45]) and the second row shows the variability
across different universal perturbations. Row 3 shows predictions
and confidence score for the proposed defense and the next best
defense (PRN [1], PD [52], FD [66] and HGD [31]). Our method
effectively defends against each universal attack by correctly clas-
sifying (green) the image with high confidence while all the other
defenses misclassify it (red).
to other networks or images [63, 32, 47]. Other methods
to generate image-dependent adversarial samples include
accessing only the network predictions [20, 46, 61], us-
ing surrogate networks [48] and gradient approximation [2].
Although there is significant prior work on adversarial de-
fenses such as adversarial training [63, 15, 35, 66], ensem-
ble training [64], randomized image transformations and
denoising [16, 52, 10, 40, 52, 60, 10, 33, 31] and adversarial
sample rejection [29, 34, 67, 36, 37], a DNN is still vulner-
able to adversarial perturbations added to a non-negligible
portion of the input [2, 65]. These defenses mostly focus
on making a DNN robust to image-dependent adversarial
perturbations which are less likely to be encountered in re-
alistic vision applications [1, 45].
Our proposed work focuses on defending against univer-
sal adversarial attacks. Unlike the aforementioned image-
dependent adversarial attacks, universal adversarial attacks
[38, 44, 43, 51, 23, 45, 53, 42, 30] construct a single image-
agnostic perturbation that when added to any unseen im-
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age fools DNNs into making erroneous predictions with
very high confidence. These universal perturbations are also
not unique and many adversarial directions may exist in a
DNN’s feature space ( Figure 1, row 2) [39, 14, 13]. Fur-
thermore, universal perturbations generated for one DNN
can transfer to other DNNs, making them doubly univer-
sal [38]. Such image-agnostic perturbations pose a strong
realistic threat model [45] for many vision applications as
perturbations can easily be pre-computed and then inserted
in real-time (in the form of a printed adversarial patch or
sticker) into any scene [28, 5]. For example, while perform-
ing semantic segmentation, such image-agnostic perturba-
tions can completely hide a target class (i.e., pedestrian) in
the resulting segmented scene output and adversely affect
the braking action of an autonomous car [19].
This work proposes a novel defense against a universal
adversarial threat model [38, 43, 44, 51, 23, 45] through the
following contributions:
• We show the existence of a set of vulnerable convolu-
tional filters, that are largely responsible for erroneous
predictions made by a DNN in an adversarial setting
and the `1-norm of the convolutional filter weights can
be used to identify such filters.
• Unlike, existing image-domain defenses, our proposed
DNN feature space-based defense uses trainable fea-
ture regeneration units, which regenerate activations
of the aforementioned vulnerable convolutional filters
into resilient features (adversarial noise masking).
• A fast method is proposed to generate strong synthetic
adversarial perturbations for training.
• We extensively evaluate the proposed defense on a va-
riety of DNN architectures and show that our proposed
defense outperforms all other existing defenses [1, 52,
66, 31, 35, 45] ( Figure 1).
• Without any additional attack-specific training, our de-
fense trained on one type of universal attack [38] effec-
tively defends against other different unseen universal
attacks [44, 43, 51, 45, 23, 42] ( Figure 1) and we are
the first to show such broad generalization across dif-
ferent universal attacks.
2. Related Work
Adversarial training (Adv. tr.) [63, 15, 35] has been
shown to improve DNN robustness to image-dependent
adversarial attacks through augmentation, in the training
stage, with adversarial attack examples, which are com-
puted on-the-fly for each mini-batch using gradient-ascent
to maximize the DNN’s loss. The robustness of adversar-
ial training to black-box attacks can be improved by us-
ing perturbations computed against different target DNNs
that are chosen from an ensemble of DNNs [64]. Kan-
nan et al. [22] scale adversarial training to ImageNet [9]
by encouraging the adversarial loss to match logits for pairs
of adversarial and perturbation-free images (logit pairing)
but this latter method fails against stronger iterative at-
tacks [11]. In addition to adversarially training the base-
line DNN, prior works ([66], [27]) further improved DNN
robustness to image-dependent attacks by denoising inter-
mediate DNN feature maps, either through a non-local
mean denoiser (feature denoising [66]) or a denoising auto-
encoder (fortified nets [27]). Although Xie et al. report
effective robustness against a strong PGD attack [35] evalu-
ated on ImageNet [9], the additional non-local mean denois-
ers only add a 4% improvement over a DNN trained using
standard adversarial training. Compared to feature denois-
ing (FD) [66], the proposed feature regeneration approach
has the following differences: (1) our feature regeneration
units are not restricted to only perform denoising, but con-
sists of stacks of trainable convolutional layers that provide
our defense the flexibility to learn an appropriate feature-
restoration transform that effectively defends against uni-
versal attacks, unlike the non-local mean denoiser used in
FD; (2) in a selected DNN layer, only a subset of feature
maps which are the most susceptible to adversarial noise
(identified by our ranking metric) are regenerated leaving
all other feature maps unchanged, whereas FD denoises all
feature maps, which can result in over-correction or intro-
duce unwanted artifacts in feature maps that admit very low
magnitude noise; (3) instead of adversarially training all the
parameters of the baseline DNN as in FD, we only train the
parameters in the feature renegeration units (up to 90% less
parameters than a baseline DNN) and leave all parameters
in the baseline DNN unchanged, which can speed up train-
ing and reduce the risk of over-fitting.
Image-domain defenses mitigate the impact of adversar-
ial perturbations by utilizing non-differentiable transforma-
tions of the input such as image compression [10, 8, 33],
frequency domain denoising [60] and image quilting and
reconstruction [16, 40] etc. However, such approaches in-
troduce unnecessary artifacts in clean images resulting in
accuracy loss [1][52]. Prakash et al. [52] propose a two-
step defense that first performs random local pixel redistri-
bution, followed by a wavelet denoising. Liao et al. [31]
append a denoising autoencoder at the input of the baseline
DNN and train it using a reconstruction loss that minimizes
the error between higher layer representations of the DNN
for an input pair of clean and denoised adversarial images
(high level guided denoiser). Another popular line of de-
fenses explores the idea of first detecting an adversarially
perturbed input and then either abstaining from making a
prediction or further pre-processing adversarial input for re-
liable predictions [29, 34, 67, 36, 37].
All of the aforementioned defenses are geared towards
image-specific gradient-based attacks and none of them has,
as of yet, been shown to defend against image-agnostic at-
tacks. Initial attempts at improving robustness to universal
attacks involved modelling the distribution of such pertur-
bations [38, 17, 50], followed by model fine-tuning over
this distribution of universal perturbations. However, the
robustness offered by these methods has been unsatisfac-
tory [45, 38] as the retrained network ends up overfitting
to the small set of perturbations used. Extending adversar-
ial training for image-dependent attacks to universal attacks
has been attempted in [45] and [57]. Ruan and Dai [56]
use additional shadow classifiers to identify and reject im-
ages perturbed by universal perturbations. Akhtar et al. [1]
propose a defense against the universal adversarial pertur-
bations attack (UAP) [38], using a detector which identifies
adversarial images and then denoises them using a learnable
Perturbation Rectifying Network (PRN).
3. Universal threat model
Let µc represent the distribution of clean (unperturbed)
images in Rd,F (·) be a classifier that predicts a class label
F (x) for an image x ∈ Rd. The universal adversarial per-
turbation attack seeks a perturbation vector v ∈ Rd under
the following constraints [38]:
P
x∼µc
(
F (x+ v) 6= F (x)
)
≥ (1− δ) s.t. ‖v‖p ≤ ξ (1)
where P (·) denotes probability, ‖ · ‖p is the `p-norm with
p ∈ [1,∞), (1− δ) is the target fooling ratio with δ ∈ [0, 1)
(i.e., the fraction of samples in µc that change labels when
perturbed by an adversary), and ξ controls the magnitude of
adversarial perturbations.
4. Feature-Domain Adversarial Defense
4.1. Stability of Convolutional Filters
In this work, we assess the vulnerability of individual
convolutional filters and show that, for each layer, certain
filter activations are significantly more disrupted than oth-
ers, especially in the early layers of a DNN.
For a given layer, let φm(u) be the output (activation
map) of themth convolutional filter with kernel weightsWm
for an input u. Let em = φm(u+r)−φm(u) be the additive
noise (perturbation) that is caused in the output activation
map φm(u) as a result of applying an additive perturbation
r to the input u. It can be shown (refer to Supplementary
Material) that em is bounded as follows:
‖em‖∞ ≤ ‖Wm‖1‖r‖p (2)
where as before ‖·‖p is the `p-norm with p ∈ [1,∞). Equa-
tion 2 shows that the `1-norm of the filter weights can be
used to identify and rank convolutional filter activations in
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Figure 2. Observed `∞-norm for universal adversarial noise in the
activation maps of ranked convolutional filters (ordered using our
`1-norm ranking measure, from most to least vulnerable) of the
first layer of CaffeNet [25] and GoogLeNet [62]. The `∞-norm
attack is used with ξ ≤ 10, i.e. ‖r‖∞ ≤ 10. (a) Adversarial
noise upper-bound (Equation 2) in ranked conv-1 filter activations
of DNNs. (b) Observed `∞-norm for adversarial noise in ranked
conv-1 filter activations of DNNs.
Top-1 accuracy
Figure 3. Effect of masking `∞-norm universal adversarial noise
in ranked convolutional filter activations of the first layer in Caf-
feNet [25], GoogLeNet [62] and VGG-16 [59], evaluated on a
1000-image subset of the ImageNet [9] training set. Top-1 ac-
curacies for perturbation-free images are 0.58, 0.70 and 0.69 for
CaffeNet, GoogLeNet and VGG-16, respectively. Similarly, top-1
accuracies for adversarially perturbed images with no noise mask-
ing are 0.1, 0.25 and 0.25 for CaffeNet, GoogLeNet and VGG-16,
respectively. Masking the noise in just 50% of the ranked filter
activations restores most of the lost accuracy for all three DNNs.
terms of their ability to restrict perturbation in their activa-
tion maps. For example, filters with a small weight `1-norm
would result in insignificant small perturbations in their out-
put when their input is perturbed, and are thus considered
to be less vulnerable to perturbations in the input. For an
`∞-norm universal adversarial input, Figure 2a shows the
upper-bound on the adversarial noise in ranked (using the
proposed `1-norm ranking) conv-1 filter activations of Caf-
feNet [25] and GoogLeNet [62], while Figure 2b shows the
corresponding observed `∞-norm for adversarial noise in
the respective DNN filter activations. We can see that our
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Figure 4. Resilient Feature Regeneration Defense: Convolutional filter activations in the baseline DNN (top) are first sorted in order
of vulnerability to adversarial noise using their respective filter weight norms (Section 4.1). For each considered layer, we use a feature
regeneration unit, consisting of a residual block with a single skip connection (4 layers), to regenerate only the most adversarially sus-
ceptible activations into resilient features that restore the lost accuracy of the baseline DNN, while leaving the remaining filter activations
unchanged. We train these units on both clean and perturbed images in every mini-batch using the same target loss as the baseline DNN
such that all parameters of the baseline DNN are left unchanged during training.
‖W‖1-based ranking correlates well with the degree of per-
turbation (maximum magnitude of the noise perturbation)
that is induced in the filter outputs. Similar observations
can be made for other convolutional layers in the network.
In Figure 3, we evaluate the impact of masking the ad-
versarial noise in such ranked filters on the overall top-1
accuracy of CaffeNet [25], VGG-16 [59] and GoogLeNet
[62]. Specifically, we randomly choose a subset of 1000
images (1 image per class) from the ImageNet [9] training
set and generate adversarially perturbed images by adding
an `∞-norm universal adversarial perturbation [38]. The
top-1 accuracies for perturbation-free images are 0.58, 0.70
and 0.69 for CaffeNet, GoogLeNet and VGG-16, respec-
tively. Similarly, the top-1 accuracies for adversarially per-
turbed images of the same subset are 0.10, 0.25 and 0.25 for
CaffeNet, GoogLeNet and VGG-16, respectively. Masking
the adversarial perturbations in 50% of the most vulnerable
filter activations significantly improves DNN performance,
resulting in top-1 accuracies of 0.56, 0.68 and 0.67 for Caf-
feNet, GoogLeNet and VGG-16, respectively, and validates
our proposed selective feature regeneration scheme. See
Figure 1 in Supplementary Material for similar experiments
for higher layers.
4.2. Resilient Feature Regeneration Defense
Our proposed defense is illustrated in Figure 4. We learn
a task-driven feature restoration transform (i.e., feature re-
generation unit) for convolutional filter activations severely
disrupted by adversarial input. Our feature regeneration
unit does not modify the remaining activations of the base-
line DNN. A similar approach of learning corrective trans-
forms for making networks more resilient to image blur and
additive white Gaussian noise has been explored in [4].
Let Sl represent a set consisting of indices for convo-
lutional filters in the lth layer of a DNN. Furthermore, let
Slreg be the set of indices for filters we wish to regen-
erate (Section 4.1) and let Sladv be the set of indices for
filters whose activations are not regenerated (i.e., Sl =
Slreg ∪ Sladv ). If ΦSlreg represents the convolutional filter
outputs to be regenerated in the lth layer, then our feature
regeneration unit in layer l performs a feature regeneration
transform Dl(·) under the following conditions:
Dl(ΦSlreg (u+ r)) ≈ ΦSlreg (u) (3)
and
Dl(ΦSlreg (u)) ≈ ΦSlreg (u) (4)
where u is the unperturbed input to the lth layer of convolu-
tional filters and r is an additive perturbation that acts on u.
In Equations 3 and 4,≈ denotes similarity based on classifi-
cation accuracy in the sense that features are restored to re-
gain the classification accuracy of the original perturbation-
free activation map. Equation 3 forces Dl(·) to pursue task-
driven feature regeneration that restores lost accuracy of the
DNN while Equation 4 ensures that prediction accuracy on
unperturbed activations is not decreased, without any ad-
ditional adversarial perturbation detector. We implement
Dl(·) (i.e., feature regeneration unit) as a shallow residual
block [18], consisting of two stacked 3 × 3 convolutional
Clean
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Figure 5. Effectiveness of feature regeneration units at masking adversarial perturbations in DNN feature maps for images perturbed by
universal perturbations (UAP [38], NAG [44], GAP [51] and sPGD [45]). Perturbation-free feature map (clean), different adversarially
perturbed feature maps (Row 1) and corresponding feature maps regenerated by feature regeneration units (Row 2) are obtained for a single
filter channel in conv1 1 layer of VGG-16 [59], along with an enlarged view of a small region in the feature map (yellow box). Feature
regeneration units are only trained on UAP [38] attack examples but are very effective at suppressing adversarial artifacts generated by
unseen attacks (e.g., NAG [44], GAP [51] and sPGD [45]).
layers sandwiched between a couple of 1× 1 convolutional
layers and a single skip connection. Dl(·) is estimated using
a target loss from the baseline network, through backprop-
agation, see Figure 4, but with significantly fewer trainable
parameters compared to the baseline network.
Given an L layered DNN Φ, pre-trained for an image
classification task, Φ can be represented as a function that
maps network input x to an N -dimensional output label
vector Φ(x) as follows:
Φ = ΦL ◦ ΦL−1 ◦ . . .Φ2 ◦ Φ1 (5)
where Φl is a mapping function (set of convolutional filters,
typically followed by a non-linearity) representing the lth
DNN layer andN is the dimensionality of the DNN’s output
(i.e., number of classes). Without any loss of generality,
the resulting DNN after deploying a feature regeneration
unit that operates on the set of filters represented by Slreg in
layer l is given by:
Φreg = ΦL ◦ ΦL−1 ◦ . . .Φlreg . . .Φ2 ◦ Φ1 (6)
where Φlreg represents the new mapping function for layer
l, such that Dl(·) regenerates only activations of the filter
subset ΦSlreg and all the remaining filter activations (i.e.,
ΦSladv ) are left unchanged. If Dl(·) is parameterized by θl,
then the feature regeneration unit can be trained by mini-
mizing:
J (θl) = 1
K
K∑
k=1
L(yk,Φreg(xk)) (7)
where L is the same target loss function of the baseline
DNN (e.g., cross-entropy classification loss), yk is the tar-
get output label for the kth input image xk,K represents the
total number of images in the training set consisting of both
clean and perturbed images. As we use both clean and per-
turbed images during training, xk in Equation 7, represents
a clean or an adversarially perturbed image.
In Figure 5, we visualize DNN feature maps perturbed
by various universal perturbations and the corresponding
feature maps regenerated by our feature regeneration units,
which are only trained on UAP [38] attack examples. Com-
pared to the perturbation-free feature map (clean), corre-
sponding feature maps for adversarially perturbed images
(Row 1) have distinctly visible artifacts that reflect the uni-
versal perturbation pattern in major parts of the image. In
comparison, feature maps regenerated by our feature regen-
eration units (Row 2) effectively suppress these adversarial
perturbations, preserve the object discriminative attributes
of the clean feature map and are also robust to unseen at-
tacks (e.g, NAG [44], GAP [51] and sPGD [45]), as illus-
trated in Figure 5 and Table 5.
4.3. Generating Synthetic Perturbations
Training-based approaches are susceptible to data over-
fitting, especially when the training data is scarce or does
not have adequate diversity. Generating a diverse set of
adversarial perturbations ( ≥ 100) using existing attack al-
gorithms (e.g., [38, 44, 51, 45]), in order to avoid overfit-
ting, can be computationally prohibitive. We propose a fast
method (Algorithm 1) to construct synthetic universal ad-
versarial perturbations from a small set of adversarial per-
turbations, V ⊆ Rd, that is computed using any existing
universal attack generation method ([38, 44, 51, 45]). Start-
ing with the synthetic perturbation vsyn set to zero, we itera-
tively select a random perturbation vnew ∈ V and a random
scale factor α ∈ [0, 1] and update vsyn as follows:
vsyn(t) = αvnew + (1− α)vsyn(t− 1) (8)
where t is the iteration number. This process is repeated
until the `2-norm of vsyn exceeds a threshold η. We set the
threshold η to be the minimum `2-norm of perturbations in
the set V .
Algorithm 1Generating Synthetic Adversarial Perturbation
Input: Set of pre-computed perturbations V ⊆ Rd such that vi ∈
V is the ith perturbation; threshold η
Output: Synthetic perturbation vsyn ∈ Rd
1: vsyn = 0
2: while ‖vsyn‖2 ≤ η do
3: α ∼ uniform(0, 1)
4: vnew
rand∼ V
5: vsyn = αvnew + (1− α)vsyn
6: end while
7: return vsyn
Unlike the approach of Akhtar et al. [1], which uses an it-
erative random walk along pre-computed adversarial direc-
tions, the proposed algorithm has two distinct advantages:
1) the same algorithm can be used for different types of
attack norms without any modification, and 2) Equation 8
(Step 5 in Algorithm 1) automatically ensures that the `∞-
norm of the perturbation does not violate the constraint for
an `∞-norm attack (i.e., `∞-norm ≤ ξ) and, therefore, no
additional steps, like computing a separate perturbation unit
vector and ensuring that the resultant perturbation strength
is less than ξ, are needed.
5. Assessment
We use the ImageNet validation set (ILSVRC2012) [9]
with all 50000 images and a single crop evaluation (unless
specified otherwise) in our experiments. All our experi-
ments are implemented using Caffe [21] and for each tested
attack we use publicly provided code. We report our results
in terms of top-1 accuracy and the restoration accuracy pro-
posed by Akhtar et al. [1]. Given a set Ic containing clean
images and a set Ip/c containing clean and perturbed im-
ages in equal numbers, the restoration accuracy is given by:
Restoration accuracy =
acc(Ip/c)
acc(Ic)
(9)
where acc(·) is the top-1 accuracy. We use the universal ad-
versarial perturbation (UAP) attack [38] for evaluation (un-
less specified otherwise) and compute 5 independent uni-
versal adversarial test perturbations per network using a set
of 10000 held out images randomly chosen from the Ima-
geNet training set with the fooling ratio for each perturba-
tion lower-bounded to 0.8 on the held out images and the
maximum normalized inner product between any two per-
turbations for the same DNN upper-bounded to 0.15.
5.1. Defense Training Methodology
In our proposed defense (Figure 4), only the parame-
ters for feature regeneration units have to be trained and
these parameters are updated to minimize the cost func-
tion given by Equation 7. Although we expect the pre-
diction performance of defended models to improve with
higher regeneration ratios (i.e., fraction of convolutional fil-
ter activations regenerated), we only regenerate 50% of the
convolutional filter activations in a layer and limit the num-
ber of deployed feature regeneration units (1 per layer) as
min(#DNN layers, 6)1. Using Algorithm 1, we generate
2000 synthetic perturbations from a set V of 25 original
perturbations [38] and train feature regeneration units on a
single Nvidia Titan-X using a standard SGD optimizer, mo-
mentum of 0.9 and a weight decay of 0.0005 for 4 epochs of
the ImageNet training set [9]. The learning rate is dropped
by a factor of 10 after each epoch with an initial learning
rate of 0.1. After a defense model has been trained as out-
lined above, we can further iterate through the training of
our defense with additional adversarial perturbations com-
puted against our defense, which ensures robustness to sec-
ondary attacks against our defense (Section 5.2.5).
5.2. Analysis and Comparisons
5.2.1 Robustness across DNN Architectures
Top-1 accuracy of adversarially perturbed test images for
various DNNs (no defense) and our proposed defense for
respective DNNs is reported in Table 1 under both white-
box (same network used to generate and test attack) and
black-box (tested network is different from network used to
generate attack) settings. As universal adversarial perturba-
tions can be doubly universal, under a black-box setting, we
evaluate a target DNN defense (defense is trained for attacks
on target DNN) against a perturbation generated for a differ-
ent network. Top-1 accuracy for baseline DNNs is severely
affected by both white-box and black-box attacks, whereas
our proposed defense is not only able to effectively thwart
the white-box attacks but is also able to generalize to attacks
constructed for other networks without further training (Ta-
ble 1). Since different DNNs can share common adversarial
directions in their feature space, our feature regeneration
units learn to regularize such directions against unseen data
and, consequently, to defend against black-box attacks.
5.2.2 Robustness across Attack Norms
Here, we evaluate defense robustness against both `∞-norm
and `2-norm UAP [38] attacks. Since an effective defense
must not only recover the DNN accuracy against adversar-
ial images but must also maintain a high accuracy on clean
images, we use restoration accuracy (Equation 9) to mea-
sure adversarial defense robustness (Tables 2 and 3). While
Akhtar et al. [1] (PRN and PRN+det) only report defense re-
sults on the UAP [38] attack, we also compare results with
pixel-domain defenses such as Pixel Deflection (PD [52])
and High Level Guided Denoiser (HGD [31]), defenses that
1From Figure 3 (main paper) and Figure 1 in Supplementary Material,
we observe that an empirical regeneration ratio of 50% works well. Sim-
ilarly, although feature regeneration units can be deployed for each layer
in a DNN, from Figure 2 in Supplementary Material, we observe that re-
generating features in at most 6 layers in a DNN effectively recovers lost
prediction performance.
Table 1. Cross-DNN evaluation on ILSVRC2012: Top-1 accu-
racy against a `∞-norm UAP [38] attack with ξ = 10 and target
fooling ratio of 0.8. DNNs in column one are tested with attacks
generated for DNNs in row one.
CaffeNet VGG-F GoogleNet VGG-16 Res152
CaffeNet [25], orginal accuracy 56.4%
CaffeNet 0.109 0.298 0.456 0.431 0.405
Ours 0.542 0.524 0.510 0.457 0.470
VGG-F [7], original accuracy 58.4%
VGG-F 0.299 0.150 0.461 0.417 0.426
Ours 0.556 0.550 0.548 0.492 0.513
GoogLeNet [62], original accuracy 68.6%
GoogLeNet 0.519 0.539 0.260 0.472 0.473
Ours 0.651 0.653 0.653 0.637 0.642
VGG-16 [59], original accuracy 68.4%
VGG-16 0.549 0.559 0.519 0.240 0.484
Ours 0.615 0.622 0.646 0.655 0.631
Res152 [18], original accuracy 79%
Res152 0.720 0.726 0.692 0.626 0.270
Ours 0.764 0.769 0.769 0.763 0.761
Table 2. Same-norm evaluation on ILSVRC2012: Restoration
accuracy of DNNs and defenses against an `∞-norm UAP [38]
attack with ξ = 10.
Methods CaffeNet VGG-F GoogLeNet VGG-16 Res152
`∞-norm attack, ξ = 10
Baseline 0.596 0.628 0.691 0.681 0.670
PRN [1] 0.936 0.903 0.956 0.690 0.834
PRN+det [1] 0.952 0.922 0.964 0.690 0.834
PD [52] 0.873 0.813 0.884 0.818 0.845
JPEG comp. [10] 0.554 0.697 0.830 0.693 0.670
Feat. Distill. [33] 0.671 0.689 0.851 0.717 0.676
HGD [31] n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.739
Adv. tr. [35] n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.778
FD [66] n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.819
Ours 0.976 0.967 0.970 0.963 0.982
Table 3. Cross-norm evaluation on ILSVRC2012: Restoration
accuracy against an `2-norm UAP [38] attack. Our defense, as
well as the other defense models, are trained only on `∞-norm
attack examples with ξ = 10.
Methods CaffeNet VGG-F GoogLeNet VGG-16 Res152
`2-norm attack, ξ = 2000
Baseline 0.677 0.671 0.682 0.697 0.709
PRN [1] 0.922 0.880 0.971 0.834 0.868
PRN+det [1] 0.936 0.900 0.975 0.835 0.868
PD [52] 0.782 0.784 0.857 0.809 0.840
HGD [31] n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.730
Adv. tr. [35] n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.778
FD [66] n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.818
Ours 0.964 0.961 0.912 0.876 0.926
Table 4. Restoration accuracy on ILSVRC2012 for `∞-norm
UAP [38] attack with stronger perturbation strengths (ξ) against
CaffeNet. Our defense, as well as the other defense models, are
trained only on `∞-norm attack examples with ξ=10.
Method ξ = 10 ξ = 15 ξ = 20 ξ = 25
Baseline 0.596 0.543 0.525 0.519
PRN [1] 0.936 0.603 0.555 0.526
PRN+det [1] 0.952 0.604 0.555 0.526
PD [52] 0.873 0.616 0.549 0.524
Ours 0.976 0.952 0.896 0.854
use JPEG compression (JPEG comp. [10]) or DNN-based
compression like Feature Distillation (Feat. Distill. [33]),
defenses that use some variation of adversarial training like
Feature Denoising (FD [66]) and standard Adversarial train-
ing (Adv. tr. [35]).
In Table 2, we report results for an `∞-norm UAP at-
tack [38] against various DNNs and show that our pro-
posed defense outperforms all the other defenses2 for all
networks with the highest restoration accuracy (98.2%) be-
ing achieved for Res152 [18]. Our feature regeneration
units are trained on `∞-norm attack examples (same-norm
evaluation). Even without a perturbation detector, our de-
fense outperforms the existing defense with a perturbation
detector (PRN+det) of Akhtar et al. [1] for all networks.
Similarly, for Res152 [18], we outperform adversarially
trained defenses (FD [66], Adv. tr. [35]) and pixel denoisers
(PD [52], HGD [31]) by more than 10%. In Table 3, we also
evaluate how well our defense trained on an `∞-norm attack
defends against an `2-norm attack (cross-norm evaluation).
Our feature regeneration units are able to effectively gen-
eralize to even cross-norm attacks and outperform all other
defenses for most DNNs.
5.2.3 Stronger Attack Perturbations (ξ > 10)
Although we use an attack perturbation strength ξ = 10 dur-
ing training, in Table 4, we evaluate the robustness of our
defense when the adversary violates the attack threat model
using a higher perturbation strength. Compared to the base-
line DNN (no defense) as well as PRN [1] and PD [52],
our proposed defense is much more effective at defend-
ing against stronger perturbations, outperforming other de-
fenses by almost 30% even when the attack strength is more
than double the value used to train our defense. Although
defense robustness decreases for unseen higher perturba-
tion strengths, our defense handles this drop-off much more
gracefully and shows much better generalization across at-
tack perturbation strengths, as compared to existing de-
fenses. We also note that adversarial perturbations are no
longer visually imperceptible at ξ = 25.
5.2.4 Generalization to Unseen Universal Attacks
Although the proposed method effectively defends against
UAP [38] attacks (Tables1-4), we also assess its robustness
to other unseen universal attacks without additional attack-
specific training. Note that [1] and [45] do not cover this
experimental setting. Since existing attacks in the litera-
ture are tailored to specific DNNs, we use CaffeNet [25]
and Res152 [18] DNNs for covering a variety of universal
attacks like Fast Feature Fool (FFF) [43], Network for ad-
versary generation (NAG) [44], Singular fool (S.Fool) [23],
2FD [66], HGD [31] and Adv. tr. [35] defenses publicly provide trained
defense models only for Res152 [18]) among the evaluated DNNs; we re-
port results using only the DNN models provided by the respective authors.
Table 5. Robustness to unseen attacks: Restoration accuracy
evaluated on ILSVRC2012, against other unseen universal attacks
using our defense trained on just `∞-norm UAP [38] attack exam-
ples with a fooling ratio and `∞-norm of 0.8 and 10, respectively.
Results for all other defenses are reported using publicly provided
defense models. Attacks are constructed for the baseline DNN.
CaffeNet Res152
Methods FFF [43] NAG [44] S.Fool [23] GAP [51] G-UAP [42] sPGD [45]
Baseline 0.645 0.670 0.815 0.640 0.726 0.671
PRN [1] 0.729 0.660 0.732 0.774 0.777 0.823
PD [52] 0.847 0.767 0.871 0.784 0.807 0.890
HGD [31] n/a n/a n/a 0.663 0.782 0.932
Adv. tr [35] n/a n/a n/a 0.776 0.777 0.775
FD [66] n/a n/a n/a 0.815 0.813 0.815
Ours 0.941 0.840 0.914 0.922 0.914 0.976
Generative adversarial perturbation (GAP) [51], Gener-
alizable data-free universal adversarial perturbation (G-
UAP) [42], and stochastic PGD (sPGD) [45].
Our defense trained on just UAP [38] attack examples
is able to effectively defend against all other universal at-
tacks and outperforms all other existing defenses (Table 5).
Even against stronger universal attacks like NAG [44] and
GAP [51], we outperform all other defenses including
PRN [1], which is also trained on similar UAP [38] attack
examples, by almost 10%. From our results in Table 5, we
show that our feature regeneration units learn transforma-
tions that generalize effectively across perturbation patterns
(Figure 5). Note that we are the first to show such broad
generalization across universal attacks.
5.2.5 Robustness to Secondary White-Box Attacks
Although in practical situations, an attacker may not have
full or even partial knowledge of a defense, for complete-
ness, we also evaluate our proposed defense against a white-
box attack on the defense (secondary attacks), i.e., adver-
sary has full access to the gradient information of our fea-
ture regeneration units. We use the UAP [38] (on CaffeNet)
and sPGD [45] (on Res152) attacks for evaluation.
Figure 6 shows the robustness of our defense to such a
secondary UAP [38] attack seeking to achieve a target fool-
ing ratio of 0.85 on our defense for the CaffeNet [25] DNN.
Such an attack can easily converge (achieve target fooling
ratio) against a baseline DNN in less than 2 attack epochs,
eventually achieving a final fooling ratio of 0.9. Similarly,
we observe that even PRN [1] is susceptible to a secondary
UAP [38] attack, achieving a fooling ratio of 0.87, when the
adversary can access gradient information for its Perturba-
tion Rectifying Network. In comparison, using our defense
model with iterative adversarial example training (as de-
scribed in Section 5.1), the white-box adversary can achieve
a maximum fooling ratio of only 0.42, which is 48% lower
than the fooling ratio achieved against PRN [1], even after
attacking our defense for 600 attack epochs. Similarly, in
Table 6, using the same attack setup outlined in [45], we
evaluate white-box sPGD [45] attacks computed by utiliz-
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Figure 6. Robustness to white-box attacks against defense (sec-
ondary attacks): Achieved fooling ratio by attacker vs. attack
epochs for an `∞-norm UAP [38] attack (ξ = 10) against Caf-
feNet [25], where the attacker has full knowledge of the baseline
DNN and also the defense. The target fooling ratio for attack is set
to 0.85.
Table 6. Top-1 accuracy for white-box `∞-norm sPGD [45] attack
against Res152-based `∞-norm defenses (ξ = 10), evaluated on
ILSVRC2012. Top-1 accuracy for Res152 on clean images is 0.79.
Baseline Ours FD [66] Adv. tr. [35] HGD [31] Shared tr. [45]3
0.270 0.731 0.641 0.635 0.689 0.727
ing gradient-information of both the defense and the base-
line DNNs, for Res152 [18]. As shown in Table 6, our de-
fense trained using sPGD attack examples computed against
both the baseline DNN and our defense, is robust to subse-
quent sPGD white-box attacks.
6. Conclusion
We show that masking adversarial noise in a few select
DNN activations significantly improves their adversarial ro-
bustness. To this end, we propose a novel selective fea-
ture regeneration approach that effectively defends against
universal perturbations, unlike existing adversarial defenses
which either pre-process the input image to remove adver-
sarial noise and/or retrain the entire baseline DNN through
adversarial training. We show that the `1-norm of the con-
volutional filter kernel weights can be effectively used to
rank convolutional filters in terms of their susceptibility to
adversarial perturbations. Regenerating only the top 50%
ranked adversarially susceptible features in a few DNN lay-
ers is enough to restore DNN robustness and outperform
all existing defenses. We validate the proposed method
by comparing against existing state-of-the-art defenses and
show better generalization across different DNNs, attack
norms and even unseen attack perturbation strengths. In
contrast to existing approaches, our defense trained solely
on one type of universal adversarial attack examples effec-
tively defends against other unseen universal attacks, with-
out additional attack-specific training. We hope this work
3 As an implementation of Shared Adversarial Training (Shared tr. [45])
was not publicly available, we report results published by the authors
in [45] and which were only provided for white-box attacks computed
against the defense, whereas results for white-box attacks against the base-
line DNN were not provided.
encourages researchers to design adversarially robust DNN
architectures and training methods which produce convolu-
tional filter kernels that have a small `1-norm.
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Supplementary Material
A. Maximum Adversarial Perturbation
We show in Section 4.1 of the main paper that the max-
imum possible adversarial perturbation in a convolutional
filter activation map is proportional to the `1-norm of its cor-
responding filter kernel weights. Here, we provide a proof
for Equation 2 in the main paper. For simplicity but with-
out loss of generality, let A be a single-channel n× n input
to a k × k convolutional filter with kernel W . For illustra-
tion, consider a 3×3 input A and a 2×2 kernel W as shown
below:
A =
a1 a2 a3a4 a5 a6
a7 a8 a9
 and W = [w11 w12
w21 w22
]
Assuming the origin for the kernel W is at the top-left
corner and no padding for A (same proof applies also if
padding is applied), then the vectorized convolutional out-
put
e = vec(A ∗W )
=

w11 · a1 + w12 · a2 + w21 · a4 + w22 · a5
w11 · a2 + w12 · a3 + w21 · a5 + w22 · a6
w11 · a4 + w12 · a5 + w21 · a7 + w22 · a8
w11 · a5 + w12 · a6 + w21 · a8 + w22 · a9

can be expressed as a matrix-vector product as follows:
e = vec(A ∗W ) = Mr (10)
M =

w11 w12 0 w21 w22 0 0 0 0
0 w11 w12 0 w21 w22 0 0 0
0 0 0 w11 w12 0 w21 w22 0
0 0 0 0 w11 w12 0 w21 w22
 (11)
rT =
[
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9
]
(12)
where vec(·) unrolls all elements of the input matrix with
N1 rows and N2 columns into an output column vector of
size N1N2, M is a circulant convolution matrix formed us-
ing the elements of W and r = vec(A).
Similarly, for A ∈ Rn×n and W ∈ Rk×k such that wij
is an element in row i and column j of W , we have M ∈
R(n−k+1)2×n2 , and e ∈ R(n−k+1)2 is given by:
e = Mr (13)
‖e‖∞ = ‖Mr‖∞ = max
1≤i≤(n−k+1)2
|
n2∑
j=1
mijrj | (14)
≤ max
1≤i≤(n−k+1)2
n2∑
j=1
|mij ||rj |
≤
(
max
1≤i≤(n−k+1)2
n2∑
j=1
|mij |
)
max
1≤j≤n2
|rj |
≤
(
max
1≤i≤(n−k+1)2
n2∑
j=1
|mij |
)
‖r‖∞ (15)
where r = vec(A), r ∈ Rn2 such that rj is the jth element
in the vector r and mij is the element in row i and column
j of the matrix M .
From Equation 11,
n2∑
j=1
|mij | is always equal to the `1-
norm of the filter kernel weights ‖W‖1 =
k∑
i′=1
k∑
j′=1
|wi′j′ |
for any row i, 1 ≤ i ≤ (n− k + 1)2. Equation 15, can now
be rewritten as:
‖e‖∞ ≤ ‖W‖1‖r‖∞ (16)
Since ‖ · ‖∞ ≤ ‖ · ‖1 and ‖ · ‖∞ ≤ ‖ · ‖2, we have the
following inequality:
‖e‖∞ ≤ ‖W‖1‖r‖p (17)
where p = 1, 2,∞.
B. Masking Perturbations in Other Layers
In Section 4.1 of the main paper (Figure 3 in the main
paper), we evaluate the effect of masking `∞-norm adver-
sarial perturbations in a ranked subset (using `1-norm rank-
ing) of convolutional filter activation maps of the first con-
volutional layer of a DNN. Here, in Figure 7, we evaluate
the effect of masking `∞-norm adversarial perturbations in
ranked filter activation maps of the convolutional layers 2,
3, 4 and 5 of CaffeNet [25] and VGG-16 [59]. We use the
same evaluation setup as in Section 4.1 of the main paper
(i.e., 1000 image random subset of the ImageNet [9] train-
ing set). The top-1 accuracy for perturbation-free images
of the subset are 0.58 and 0.69 for CaffeNet and VGG-16,
respectively. Similarly, the top-1 accuracies for adversar-
ially perturbed images in the subset are 0.10 and 0.25 for
CaffeNet and VGG-16, respectively. Similar to our obser-
vations in Section 4.1 of the main paper, for most DNN
layers, masking the adversarial perturbations in just the top
50% most susceptible filter activation maps (identified by
using the `1-norm ranking measure, Section 4.1 of the pa-
per), is able to recover most of the accuracy lost by the base-
line DNN (Figure 7). Specifically, masking the adversar-
ial perturbations in the top 50% ranked filters of VGG-16
is able to restore at least 84% of the baseline accuracy on
perturbation-free images.
C. Feature Regeneration Units: An Ablation
Study
In general, feature regeneration units can be added at the
output of each convolutional layer in a DNN. However, this
Top-1 accuracy Top-1 accuracy
Top-1 accuracy Top-1 accuracy
Figure 7. Effect of masking `∞-norm universal adversarial noise in ranked convolutional filter activations of CaffeNet [25] and VGG-16
[59], evaluated on a 1000-image subset of the ImageNet [9] training set. Top-1 accuracies for perturbation-free images are 0.58, 0.69 for
CaffeNet and VGG-16, respectively. Similarly, top-1 accuracies for adversarially perturbed images with no noise masking are 0.1 and 0.25
for CaffeNet and VGG-16, respectively. For VGG-16, masking the noise in just 50% of the ranked filter activations restores more than ≈
80% of the baseline accuracy on perturbation-free images.
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Figure 8. Effect of adding feature regeneration units on the restora-
tion accuracy of our proposed defense. Adding just two feature
regeneration units in GoogLeNet [62] achieves a restoration accu-
racy of 97% and adding more feature regeneration units to the
DNN does not improve results any further. For VGG-16 [59],
adding 6 feature regeneration units provides best results.
may come at the cost of increased computations, due to an
increase in the number of DNN parameters. As mentioned
in Section 5.1 of the main paper, we constrain the number
of feature regeneration units added to the DNN, in order to
avoid drastically increasing the training and inference cost
for larger DNNs (i.e., VGG-16, GoogLeNet and ResNet-
152). Here, we perform an ablation study to identify the
least number of feature regeneration units needed to at least
achieve a 95% restoration accuracy across most DNNs.
Specifically, we use VGG-16 [59] and GoogLeNet [62] for
this analysis. We evaluate the restoration accuracy on the
ImageNet [9] validation set (ILSVRC2012) by adding an
increasing number of feature regeneration units, starting
from a minimum value of 2 towards a maximum value of 10
in steps of 2. Starting from the first convolutional layer in a
DNN, each additional feature regeneration unit is added at
the output of every second convolutional layer. In Figure 8,
we report the results of this ablation study and observe that
for GoogLeNet, adding just two feature regeneration units
achieves a restoration accuracy of 97% and adding any more
feature regeneration units does not have any significant im-
pact on the restoration accuracy. However, for VGG-16,
adding only 2 feature regeneration units achieves a restora-
tion accuracy of only 91%. For VGG-16, adding more fea-
ture regeneration units improves the performance with the
best restoration accuracy of 96.2% achieved with 6 feature
regeneration units. Adding more than 6 feature regenera-
Table 7. Defense restoration accuracy for oracle DNNs equipped
with our defense for an `∞-norm UAP [38] attack (ξ = 10) using
surrogate defense DNNs equipped with our defense.
Surrogate Oracle
VGG-F + defense GoogLeNet + defense VGG-16 + defense
CaffeNet + defense 0.906 0.963 0.942
Res152 + defense 0.889 0.925 0.925
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Figure 9. Visualization of synthetic perturbations (center) com-
puted for CaffeNet [25] and GoogLeNet [62] along with their clos-
est match in the set of original perturbations (left) and a per pixel
difference map between the two (right).
tion units resulted in a minor drop in restoration accuracy
and this may be due to data over-fitting. As a result, we re-
strict the number of feature regeneration units deployed for
any DNN to min(#DNN layers, 6).
D. Attacks using Surrogate Defense DNNs
In this section, we evaluate if it is possible for an at-
tacker/adversary to construct a surrogate defense network if
it was known that our defense was adopted. In situations
where exact defense (feature regeneration units + baseline
DNN) is typically hidden from the attacker (oracle), a DNN
predicting output labels similar to our defense (surrogate),
can be effective only if an attack generated using the sur-
rogate is transferable to the oracle. UAP [38] attacks are
transferable across baseline DNNs (Table 1 in main paper),
i.e., adversarial perturbation computed for a DNN whose
model weights and architecture are known (surrogate) can
also effectively fool another target DNN that has a similar
prediction accuracy, but whose model weights and architec-
ture are not known to the attacker (oracle). Assuming that
our defense (feature regeneration units + baseline DNN) for
CaffeNet [25] and Res152 [18] is available publicly as a
surrogate, universal attack examples computed from these
DNNs may be used to attack our defenses for other DNNs,
e.g. VGG-F or VGG-16 as an oracle. We show in Ta-
ble 7 that our defense mechanism successfully breaks attack
transferability and is not susceptible to attacks from surro-
gate DNNs based on our defense.
E. Examples of Synthetic Perturbations
Sample visualizations of synthetic adversarial pertur-
bations generated using our algorithm proposed in Sec-
tion 4.3 (Algorithm 1) of the main paper are provided in
Figure 9.
F. Examples of Feature Regeneration
Additional visualizations of DNN feature maps before
and after feature regeneration using our proposed defense
in Section 4.2 of the main paper are provided in Figure 10.
G. Examples of Universal Attack Perturba-
tions
Sample visualizations of `∞-norm and `2-norm
UAP [38] attack perturbations are shown in Figure 11.
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Figure 10. Visual examples of DNN feature maps before and after feature regeneration using our proposed method, for images perturbed
by universal perturbations (UAP [38], NAG [44], GAP [51] and sPGD [45]). Perturbation-free feature map (clean feature map), different
adversarially perturbed feature maps (Rows 1, 3 and 5) and corresponding feature maps regenerated by feature regeneration units (Rows
2, 4 and 6) are obtained for a single filter channel in conv1 1 layer of VGG-16 [59]. Our Feature regeneration units are only trained on
UAP [38] attack examples.
CaffeNet:      - norm attack with    = 10
CaffeNet:      - norm attack with    = 2000
GoogLeNet:      - norm attack with    = 10
GoogLeNet:      - norm attack with    = 2000
Figure 11. Visual examples of `∞-norm and `2-norm UAP [38] attack test perturbations for CaffeNet [25] and GoogLeNet [62].
